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Laboratory experiments in industrial organization are often criticized for using
students as subjects. The criticism centers on the issue of whether a sample
of students can deliver information about the behavior of ﬁrms (or ﬁrms’ man-
agers). As a consequence, several experiments were designed to test the eﬀect of
subject pool selection on subject performance. These experiments came up with
ambiguous evidence. While Cooper et al. (1999), Montmarquette et al. (2004),
and Ball and Cech (1996) ﬁnd little or no diﬀerence in performance between
managers and students, Fehr and List (2004), Alp´ ızar et al. (2004), and Cooper
(2006) ﬁnd that in particular situations managers behave more cooperatively
than students.
The classical quantity-setting (Cournot) oligopoly is a prominent example
of strategic interaction among ﬁrms. Due to its simplicity, it is the subject
of numerous experimental studies. Despite the focus on ﬁrms’ behavior, the
external validity of Cournot experiments conducted with students has never
been challenged by conducting similar experiments with managers.
Huck et al. (2004) designed a series of experiments that comprise the common
features of most Cournot studies. Using student subjects they ﬁnd that although
participants in a duopoly sometimes collude, this rarely occurs in the market
with more than two ﬁrms. In addition, they ﬁnd that the Nash equilibrium is
a quite accurate predictor for subject performance in a Cournot triopoly.
Since the experimental evidence by Fehr and List (2004), Alp´ ızar et al. (2004),
and Cooper (2006) suggests that managers show more collusive behavior than
students, we replicate the design of Huck et al. (2004) in order to test whether
the use of student subjects instead of managers in a Cournot triopoly experiment
is sensible with regard to external validity. In particular, this study compares the
performance of middle and high-ranking Malaysian managers mainly from the
manufacturing industry with Malaysian and German undergraduate students.
Our ﬁndings support those studies suggesting that managers perform more
cooperatively than students. We also ﬁnd that the country matters (i.e. German
students perform more cooperatively than Malaysian students), while gender
aﬀects the outcome diﬀerently in Germany and Malaysia.
2 Experimental Design and Procedure
We adopt the design of Huck et al. (2004) for the triopoly case, but we use diﬀer-
ent subject populations: German students, Malaysian students, and Malaysian
managers.
2.1 The underlying model and design
In particular, we set up a symmetric Cournot triopoly1 with a homogeneous
product and ﬁxed matching lasting over 25 periods. Communication between
1As in most oligopoly experiments, the situation was economically framed.
1the ﬁrms (subjects) is not allowed; the feedback after each period contains only
aggregate information about the other ﬁrms’ performance.
The ﬁrms are acting in a market with the following demand function:
P(Q) = max{100 − Q,0}, (1)
where Q =
P3
i=1 qi. The cost function for each seller is
C (qi) = qi (2)
Under this setting, the Nash equilibrium market quantity is QN = 74.25,
whereas the symmetric collusive (monopolistic) quantity is given by QM = 49.5,
and the competitive quantity by QC = 99.
Subjects could select quantities between 1 and 100 in steps of 0.01. In each
period the participants were allowed to use a proﬁt calculator for simulating
their own and the other ﬁrms’ decisions before taking the real-output decision.
2.2 Subjects recruitment and control
We recruited 33 undergraduate students from the University of Kiel, Germany,
and 39 undergraduate students from University Sains Malaysia.2 Additionally,
we invited 33 Malaysian managers from small and medium-size ﬁrms mainly
from the manufacturing industry (plastics, cable assemblers, chip manufactur-
ers, and computer parts manufacturers) in Penang Island, West Malaysia, to
participate in the experiment. Target companies were sourced from the Federa-
tion of Malaysian Manufacturers (FMM) directory, which lists all the small and
medium size ﬁrms (SME) in Penang state. A letter of invitation was sent to the
company secretary asking him/her to forward it to the relevant person in the
company.3 Manager age ranged between 29 and 54, most of them around 35.
All of them had at least a Bachelor’s degree and two of them a PhD. As they
had Malaysian citizenship, the ethnicity of the managers was Chinese (90.9%)
and Indian. The estimated earnings of the selected group ranged between 4000
RM and 9000 RM per month, with an estimated average of 5000-6000 RM.4
The subjects participating in the three treatments had not previously par-
ticipated in an experiment. The experiment was programmed and conducted
using the z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) experimental program. In all treatments
we followed the same procedure, and used the same experimenter.5 The exper-
iment was explained and conducted in English (in Malaysia) and German. The
instructions (based on an English translation of Huck et al., 2004) were care-
fully inspected by the experimenters (one is linguistically and culturally ﬂuent
in Malaysian English, the other is in German). Regarding the currency eﬀect,
the payment was calculated to have a similar purchasing power across countries,
2Most students in Germany and Malaysia were recruited from Economics courses.
3We did not reveal the nature of the experiment, merely that it was a computer-based
experiment designed to analyze decision-making, We also announced the expected payoﬀ
range.
45000-6000 RM≈1500-1900 US$.
5We followed the procedure of Roth et al. (1991) concerning the cross-country aspects.
2so that a German student choosing the Nash equilibrium quantity along the ex-
periment (given that the whole industry also decides on the Nash equilibrium
quantity) earns e15. Under similar conditions, a Malaysian student earns 9.5
RM.6
3 Results
Following the approach of Huck et al. (2004), we start by averaging market
quantities over time. This approach allows us to explore the average perfor-
mance of each oligopoly market. Second, in order to ﬁgure out the time-series
properties of the data, we average market quantities at each time period. Last,
we inspect the pooled data across markets and over time.
3.1 The eﬀect of subject pool on performance
- Table 1 about here -
Table 1 presents the market quantities averaged over all periods, over the
last 9 periods, and over the intermediate 16 periods (periods 5 to 20, in order to
exclude beginning and end eﬀects). Table 1 suggests that the averaged quantity
selected by the Malaysian students is larger than the average quantities selected
by both the Malaysian managers and the German students. Formally, using a
Flinger and Policello robust rank order test (F-P test) we ﬁnd that the median
quantity selected by the Malaysian students is diﬀerent from the median quan-
tity selected by each of the other two samples at the 5% s.l. Also, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the median quantities selected by the German
students and the Malaysian managers are not diﬀerent from the Nash equilib-
rium quantity of 74.25, but we reject this hypothesis for the Malaysian student
sample.7
- Figure 1 about here -
Regarding analysis over time, Figure 1 presents the quantities at each time
period, averaged across oligopoly markets. The most prominent inspection from
that ﬁgure is that at almost every time period the averaged quantities across
markets selected by the Malaysian students are larger than the quantities se-
lected by the other two samples. Formally, using an F-P test we ﬁnd that the
quantities selected by Malaysian students are diﬀerent from the quantities se-
lected by Malaysian managers and German students at the 1% s.l., respectively.
6On the one hand, a vegetarian sandwich and a bottle of Coca-Cola cost about 3 RM at
the University Sains Malaysia campus, in comparison with about e3.5 at the University of
Kiel Campus. On the other hand, students’ earnings per hour (alternative cost) are about 3.5
RM in Penang in comparison with about e6.5 in Kiel. The payment is a weighted average of
these two examples.
7In addition, using an F-P test we conﬁrm that the results by Huck et al. (2004) in Berlin
are indistinguishable from our result in Kiel (2007) at the 10% s.l.
3In addition, we observe a signiﬁcant time-trend in the initial periods of the Ger-
man student treatment. This time-trend vanishes already after six periods.8 By
contrast, no signiﬁcant time-trend is observed in the Malaysian treatments.
- Figure 2 about here -
Finally, we pool the data across oligopoly markets and over time. Figure
2 presents the histograms of the pooled quantities in each treatment. Using a
t-test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the mean quantity selected by
the German students is not diﬀerent from the Nash equilibrium level of 74.25 at
the 10% s.l. However, we reject this hypothesis for the Malaysian samples (at
the 1% s.l for the Malaysian student sample and at the 5% s.l for the Malaysian
manager sample).
- Table 2 about here -
To sum up, Table 2 presents the results of a one-sample Wilcoxon sign rank
test and a t-test on whether triopoly markets perform at the Nash equilibrium
level. Accordingly, we can formulate:
Result 1: The Nash equilibrium is a quite accurate predictor for performance
in triopoly markets conducted with German students. By contrast, we reject
the hypothesis that both the Malaysian students and managers select the Nash
quantity.
- Table 3 about here -
Table 3 presents the results of statistical tests regarding diﬀerences in per-
formance between subject pools. We can now formulate the next result.
Result 2: Malaysian students perform more competitively than both Malaysian
managers and German students.
3.2 The eﬀect of gender on performance
Table 4 presents the mean quantity (and standard deviation) according to gen-
der in each sample.9 Using a t-test, we ﬁnd that the mean quantity selected by
German females is smaller (less competitive) than the mean quantity selected
by German males at the 1% s.l. Using the same procedure for the Malaysian
treatments, we ﬁnd that for both samples Malaysian males are less competitive
8Like Huck et al. (2004), we veriﬁed the time-trend by regressing the averaged quantities
on time. Huck et al. (2004) also observed a time-trend, however, in their case it vanishes after
four periods.
9The analysis in this section is based on the pooled data across subjects (ﬁrms) and over
time.
4than Malaysian females.10 These ﬁndings are reﬂected in the Pearson correla-
tion coeﬃcient between male gender and the quantity selected by the subjects.
For the German sample it equals 0.22, whereas for the Malaysian students and
managers it is equals −0.13 and −0.15, respectively (all the results being sig-
niﬁcant at the 1% level). Accordingly, we can portray result 3.
Result 3: In Germany and Malaysia gender aﬀects subject performance in op-
posite directions. German males are more competitive than German females,
while Malaysian males behave less competitively than Malaysian females.
- Table 4 about here -
3.3 The proﬁt calculator
In order to obtain further insights about subject behavior in the three treat-
ments we inspect the ‘proﬁt-calculator’ data. Pooling the data across subjects
and over time and using a total of 2625 observations, we ﬁnd that use intensity
of the proﬁt calculator (number of calculations per period) is negatively corre-
lated with the output decision.11 A possible interpretation of this result is that
subjects who decide to play collusively act in a more thoughtful way.
We also verify that the larger the average hypothetical quantity fed into the
proﬁt calculator in a given period, the larger the actual quantity selected by the
subject at that period.
4 Concluding Remarks
This study conﬁrms the ﬁndings by Huck et al. (2004) that, by and large,
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a good predictor for subject performance in
Cournot triopoly experiments (at least, the quantities selected by the three
subject pools are closer to the Nash quantity than to the other two bench-
mark quantities). However, while German students follow the Cournot strat-
egy almost perfectly, the Malaysian subjects’ quantities (both students’ and
managers’) are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the Cournot-Nash quantity. Further-
more, we ﬁnd that the Malaysian students perform more competitively than the
Malaysian managers, a result consistent with the previous studies by Fehr and
List (2004), Alp´ ızar et al. (2004), and Cooper (2006).
Finally, we ﬁnd that gender does aﬀect subject performance. Regarding
the German student sample, we ﬁnd that females behave more cooperatively
than males12, while the opposite holds for the Malaysian samples. This result
supports ﬁndings by Gneezy et al. (2009) suggesting that societal structure is
crucially linked to observed gender diﬀerences in behavior.
10Signiﬁcant at the 1% s.l.
11Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcient is equal to −0.07; it is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
12This result is in line with the study by Mason and Phillips (1991) (conducted with Amer-
ican students), who ﬁnd that females cooperate more than males in a Cournot duopoly.
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6A Instructions
• Welcome to our experiment. Please read these instructions carefully!
From now until the end of the experiment you are not allowed to commu-
nicate with the other participants. If you have any questions, please raise
your hand, and we will answer them individualy.
• At the beginning of the experiment, each one of you will be assigned a
number. From then on, you and the other participants will be identiﬁed
by this number. Please keep it until you receive your payment. In ad-
dition, there are two empty sheets of paper that you can use during the
experiment.
• In this experiment you will repeatedly be asked to make decisions that can
earn you a reasonable amount of money. How much you earn depends not
only on your decisions but also on the decisions of the other participants.
• All participants receive the same instructions.
• In this experiment you represent a ﬁrm that produces and sells the same
product, as two other ﬁrms, in the market. You will be matched with the
same two ﬁrms during the whole experiment.
• You will stay anonymous for the other ﬁrms, both during and after the
experiment.
• In each period all ﬁrms have to make one decision, namely what quantity
they wish to produce.
• The cost of production is 1 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit) per unit
(this holds for all ﬁrms).
• The following important rule holds: The higher the total (aggregate) quan-
tity produced by all ﬁrms, the lower the price in the market. Moreover,
from a certain amount of total output upwards the price will be zero.
• Your proﬁt per unit of output will be the diﬀerence between the market
price and the unit cost of 1 ECU. Note that you will make a loss if the
market price is below the unit cost. Your proﬁt per period is thus equal
to the proﬁt per unit multiplied by the number of units you sell.
• During the experiment you can use a ‘proﬁt calculator’ before you decide
on the quantity to produce. You enter your quantity and the total (ag-
gregate) quantity of the other two ﬁrms and the ‘proﬁt calculator’ will
calculate your earnings.
• In each period, the output decisions of the other two ﬁrms will be regis-
tered, the corresponding price determined, and the proﬁts computed.
7• After each period, you will get information on your screen about the quan-
tity chosen by you, the aggregate quantity chosen by the other two ﬁrms,
your payoﬀ in the current period, and your commulative payoﬀ starting
from the ﬁrst period.
• The experiment consists of exactly 25 periods.
• During the experiment, all payoﬀs are given in ECU. Each participant
starts with an initial amount of 500 ECU.
• After the experiment we will convert your payoﬀ to RM. The exchange
rate is 66.5 ECU/RM, that is, 66.5 ECU is equal to 1 RM.13
• Your total proﬁt in the experiment is the total amount you earned in the
25 periods of the experiment (plus the initial amount of 500 RM).
• At the end of the experiment we will calculate your money payoﬀ reward.
This will be done in way that ensures that the other participants will not
see how much you earned and you will not see how much they earned.
You will receive your money immediately in cash.
13The currencies and the exchange rates diﬀered across treatments.
8B Tables and Figures
German Students Malaysian Students Malaysian Managers
¯ Q1−25 74.66 (5.19) 80.83 (8.85) 75.91 (4.88)
¯ Q17−25 76.18 (5.79) 81.25 (6.93) 76.21 (4.94)
¯ Q5−20 75.51 (5.81) 80.05 (9.16) 75.96 (5.08)
Table 1: Mean (and standard deviation) of the market quantities averaged over time. ¯ Q1−25
is the average over all periods, ¯ Q17−25 is the average over the last 9 periods, ¯ Q5−20 is the
average over the middle 16 periods.
German Students Malaysian Students Malaysian Managers
Average quantity 74.64 80.81 75.91
Across-market analysis n.d d. at 5% n.d
Over-time analysis n.d d. at 1% d. at 1%
Pooled-data analysis14 n.d d. at 1% d. at 5%
Table 2: Results of a one sample Wilcoxon sign rank test to ﬁnd whether the median
quantities in the three treatments are statistically diﬀerent from the Nash equilibrium quantity
of 74.25. “n.d” denotes “no diﬀerence” at the 10% s.l, “d” denotes “signiﬁcant diﬀerence” at
a 10% s.l. or lower.
14A T-test was also performed on the pooled regression. The results conﬁrm the median
test.
9(a) Analysis across Oligopoly Markets
Test Diﬀerence between Treatments
Median test Malaysian students ∗ > Malaysian managers = German students
Variance test Malaysian students = Malaysian managers = German students
(b) Analysis over Time
Test Diﬀerence between Treatments
Mean test Malaysian students > Malaysian managers = German students
Median test Malaysian students > Malaysian managers = German students
Variance test Malaysian students = Malaysian managers = German students
(c) Analysis of Pooled Data
Test Diﬀerence between treatments
Mean test Malaysian students > Malaysian managers = German students
Median test Malaysian students > Malaysian managers = German students
Variance test Malaysian students ∗∗ > Malaysian managers > German students
Table 3: The result of a mean test (t-test), a median test (Wilcoxon sign rank test and
Flinger and Policello Robust rank order test), and a variance test (Siegel-Tukey test) testing
whether the quantities selected in the three treatments diﬀer from each other. The symbols
=, >, ∗ >, and ∗∗ > denote no diﬀerence at the 10% signiﬁcant level, diﬀerence at the 1%,
5%, and 10% s.l., respectively.
Treatment Males Females
German students 26.63 (5.92) 24.00 (4.81)
Malaysian students 25.06 (10.67) 28.55 (14.80)
Malaysian managers 24.51 (8.91) 26.50 (8.72)
Table 4: The mean (and standard deviation) of the selected individual quantities, diﬀeren-
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Figure 1: Quantities averaged across oligopoly markets at each time period (a total of 25
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(c) Malaysian manager treatment
Figure 2: Histograms of the quantities pooled across oligopoly markets and over time. The
dashed lines denote the benchmark quantities: 49.5 is the cooperative quantity, 74.25 is the
Nash quantity, and 99 is the competitive quantity.
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